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PROPERTY
DAVID H. MEANS*
Adverse Possession and Estoppel in pais
In Southern Railway-Carolina Division v. Home Invest-
ment Company', it was held that the evidence warranted a
verdict that plaintiff had lost title to a portion of its statutory
right of way both by adverse possession and by estoppel. The
Court pointed out that the necessary notice to a railway com-
pany of an adverse claim to its right of way may be implied
or inferred from the claimant's construction and maintenance
of permanent buildings on the right of way. On the evidence
the defenses of adverse possession and estoppel were found
not to be inconsistent.
Dedication of, and Prescription for, Public Ways
Woodside Mills v. United States of America2 was a suit for
an income tax refund. Basis of plaintiff's claim was an alleged
gift to Greenville County in 1950 of certain streets, sidewalks
and alleys in a mill village. The ways in question had been
opened in 1902, and thereafter were used as public ways. The
evidence established that for many years plaintiff had not
claimed them. In 1950, when about to sell the mill village,
plaintiff recorded a plat showing the ways in question, and
executed and delivered a deed of them to Greenville County.
The Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the District
Court that long prior to 1950 plaintiff had "parted with the
title" to the ways, either by dedication or by prescription. Nor
did the conveyance, whenever made, qualify as a donation for
public purposes within the meaning of § 26 (q) of the In-
ternal Revenue Code of 1939.3
Disregarding the tax question the evidence warrants the
conclusion that the public acquired an interest in the ways
prior to 1950. However, unless conveyed by the deed of 1950 it
appears that the fee would remain in the taxpayer, subject
*Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.
1. 233 S. G. 440,105 S. E. 2d 527 (1958).
2. 260 F. 2d 935 (4th Cir. 1958).
S. 26 U. S. C. A. (I. R. 0. 1939) § 26 (q).
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only to the public easement for highway purposes. Among
other cases, see Edgefield County v. Georgia Carolina Power
Company,4 cited by the Court. The Court's citation of South
Carolina Code § 10-24215 is inappropriate, since that section
deals with the acquisition by adverse possession of a corporeal
interest in land, and does not pertain to the acquisition by
prescription of an incorporeal interest, such as is an easement
for a public way.
Fee Simple Determinable Estate-Estoppel by Deed
Purvis v. McElveenG recognizes the existence in South Caro-
lina of the fee simple determinable estate. The facts were that
land had been conveyed to school trustees in fee simple, sub-
ject to the following clause: "Provided... that.., should...
a... school.., fail... to be maintained... for ... three con-
secutive years, then the said premises, without improvements
thereon, shall be considered abandoned and the same shall re-
vert back to [grantor]." The tract having ceased to be used
for school purposes after the grantor's death, a subsequent
grantee from the grantor claimed the tract as against the
grantor's heirs at law. The Court interpreted the deed as crea-
ting a fee simple determinable estate rather than a fee simple
subject to a right of entry for breach of a condition subse-
quent. The interpretation is questionable7 . If the deed had
been found to create an estate on condition subsequent there
is authority that the grantor's attempted alienation of the
right of entry destroyed the same and made the estate of the
school trustees an indefeasible ones . However, the question is
undecided in South Carolina9 , and more recent authority in-
dicates that even though an attempted assignment is ineffec-
tual, the right of entry is not thereby destroyed".
The Court correctly concluded that when imposed on a fee
both the right of entry and the possibility of reverter have
4. 104 S. C. 311, 88 S. E. 801 (1916).
5. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 10-2421.
6. 234 S. C. 94, 106 S. E. 2d 913 (1959).
7. White v. Britten, 75 S. G. 428, 56 S. E. 232 (1-906) ; RESTATEMENT,
PROPERTY § 45 comment mn and illustration 9.
8. Rice v. Boston and Worcester . R. Corp., 12 Allen 141 (Mass.
1866); Annot. 109 A. L. R. 1148 (1937); 117 A. L. R. 563 (1938); 53
A. L. R. 2d 225 (1957).
9. First Presbyterian Church v. Elliott, 65 S. G. 251, 43 S. E. 674
(1903), holds only that an assignee of the right of entry cannot enter
for breach of condition.
10. SIMES AND SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS § 1862; RESTATEMENT, PROP-
ERTY 1948 Supplement, modifying § 160 comment c.
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been held inalienable either by deed or will in South Carolina.
However, the further unqualified assertion that estoppel by
deed is not available against a claimant under a possibility of
reverter is subject to criticism. It appears not unreasonable
to hold as the Court did, that the heirs of the grantor were not
estopped by their ancestor's deed since their claim under the
possibility of reverter was by representation and not by des-
cent. However, the further holding that one of the heirs, A. H.
McElveen, was not estopped by his own deed seems erroneous.
The authorities cited are to the effect that a conveyance con-
trary to the pubilc policy does not operate as an estoppel. But
application of this principle likewise would prevent the con-
veyance by estoppel of an expectancy, which undoubtedly can
thus be conveyed in South Carolina'1 . In like manner a gen-
eral warranty deed operates to convey a contingent remainder
in jurisdictions in which such remainders are inalienable in-
terests.12 The Kentucky casels cited is inapposite since it is
opposed to South Carolina authority. The correct rule would
seem to be that possibilities of reverter are alienable by estop-
pel.14
Judicial Representation of Unborn Remaindermen
In Caine v. Griffin'5 plaintiff sought a declaration that an
earlier suit which had decreed an exchange of lands was with-
out defect which beclouded the title to the land in issue. A
question raised was whether the interest in remainder of a
class, no member of which had been born, could be transferred
from the subject land to the land exchanged therefor. In af-
firming the sufficiency of the prior suit the Court held that
a representation of the class by a guardian ad litem was
proper. All other necessary parties were found to have been
properly before the Court, either individually or as class mem-
bers, and a sufficient showing of reasonable necessity for the
exchange of the land had been made.
11. Blackwell v. Harrelson, 99 S. C. 264, 84 S. E. 233 (1914).
12. SIMES AND SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS § 1855.
13. Consolidation Coal Co. v. Riddle, 198 Ky. 256, 284 S. W. 530 (1923),
holding that a deed with covenants given by an heir apparent as
a conveyance of his expectancy will not operate by estoppel to pass the
after acquired title. The ease is contra to Blackwell v. Harrison, note
11 supra, and the prevailing American view. See SiMEs AND SMITH, Fu-
TURE INTERESTS § 395.
14. Pure Oil Co. v. Miller McFarland Drilling Co., 376 Ill. 486, 35 N.
E. 2d 854, 135 A. L. R. 567, (1941) ; SI mES, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
FUTURE INTERESTS 109 (1951).
15. 232 S. C. 562, 103 S. E. 2d 37 (1958).
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Judicial Sales
In Spillers v. Clay1 6, petitioner, attorney for certain de-
fendants in a partition suit, sought to enjoin the closing of
a judicial sale of land and to reopen the bidding on the ground
that when the sale was closed he was under a reasonable mis-
apprehension that his was the high bid. The testimony estab-
lished that the property was worth more than twice the
amount of the high bid; that plaintiff had been instructed to
bid much higher and failed to do so only because he thought
the prevailing bid was his; that immediately after the property
was knocked down plaintiff had requested he be allowed to re-
bid. The Court found the County Judge had not abused his dis-
cretion in granting plaintiff the relief he sought.
Life Tenant with Power to Sell Remainderman's
Interest in Land
In Thomason v. Hellarns17 a testator devised to his wife
.. . for and during the term of her natural life, all of my
real estate; unless it becomes necessary for her support and
comfort, in which case, and she to be the whole judge of the
necessity, she has full power to sell any part or the entire real
estate holdings without the order of any court and is hereby
empowered to execute good fee simple title to the same or any
part thereof. If at the time of death of my wife there is re-
maining any of my real estate it is my desire and I so direct
that the same go to my nephew . . . in fee simple forever."
The remainderman sued for a construction of the will and al-
leged that the widow was about to sell the land to one of her
kinsman for much less than its value. The relief sought was
that if the will be construed to give the widow a power of
sale, "the proceeds should be stamped with a trust in favor
of plaintiff and kept separate and distinct from other person-
al property and that any unused portion for her support and
comfort should belong to plaintiff." Plaintiff further sought
the right of first refusal at the same price the property had
been offered to third persons.
On appeal the Court affirmed an order sustaining the
widow's demurrer to the complaint. The will was plain and
unambiguous, and conferred a life estate upon the widow,
16. 233 S. G. 99, 103 S. E. 2d 759 (1958).
17. 233 S. C. 11, 103 S. E. 2d 324 (1958).
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with power in her sole discretion to dispose of the remainder
interest for her support and comfort; nor did the complaint
allege fraud (the allegation of an intended sale to a relative
for less than the market value was not so construed). Since
there had been no sale, plaintiff's prayer that the proceeds of
any sale be kept separate and apart from the other personal
property was premature and made no justiciable issue. Plain-
tiff's third prayer that he be accorded the right of first re-
fusal was one that he was not entitled to since the testator
had not so provided.
The Thomason case is an excellent illustration of the litiga-
tion breeding characteristics and lurking injustices inherent
in the legal life estate with power to consume remainder type
of limitation.
Recording-Priority Between Mortgage and Judgment
In Prudential Insurance Company v. Wadford 8 the ques-
tion was one of priority between the lien of a judgment and
that of a mortgage of land. The mortgage had been given on
May 21 as security for an obligation of the same date, but was
not recorded until June 21. In the meantime, judgment
against the mortgagor was entered on May 24, pursuant to
an action on an account for merchandise purchased before
May 21, the date of the mortgage. In a foreclosure action the
mortgage lien was accorded priority, which was affirmed on
appeal, the Court adhering to the rule earlier established in
Carraway v. Carraway19. Rationale of the result is that since
the debt on which the judgment is based was incurred before
the mortgage indebtedness, the judgment creditor is a prior
rather than a subsequent creditor, and the recording act thus
affords him no protection.
One dictum in Wadford is noteworthy. In South Carolina
a debatable question is whether or not a subsequent creditor
claiming the protection of the recording act against a prior
unrecorded lien must show that he advanced credit in reliance
upon the debtor's apparently unincumbered interest in the
land. While no cases involving liens upon land have been
found, as regards personal property the cases are in conflict,
18. 232 S. C. 476, 102 S. E. 2d 889 (1958).
19. 27 S. C. 576, 5 S. E. 157 (1888).
1959]
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some"° stating that the creditor need not have relied upon the
debtor's apparent interest in the chattel, while others2 ' are to
the effect that unless credit was extended in reliance upon the
creditor's ostensible interest in the chattel, the subsequent
creditor is not entitled to protection of the recording act. In
Wadford the Court states "that the recording statute was in-
tended to protect, against the lien of an unrecorded mortgage,
persons, who, without notice of it, subsequent to its execution
might reasonably have extended credit to the mortgagor, or
purchased the mortgaged property, in reliance upon his appar-
ently unencumbered ownership," (italics added) citing Carroll
v. Cash Mills.21a The inference of this dictum is that a sub-
sequent creditor will be protected only if credit was extended
in reliance upon the debtor's apparent interest in the land.
Rule in Shelley's Case
Woodle v. Tilghman22 presents a knotty constructional
problem of a type which fortunately is increasingly rare since
the Act of 1924 abolishing the Rule in Shelley's Case23. The
testator died in 1889, devising land "to Della... for life only
and then unto the lawful issue of her body, and if she should
die without children then to Robert Harper's children, share
and share alike..." The question, did Della take a fee simple
conditional estate by operation of the Rule in Shelley's case, or
a life estate only, with remainder to her children in fee sim-
ple? If Della acquired a fee simple conditional the plaintiffs,
her surviving children, were barred by her conveyance by
deed in fee simple made after the birth of issue; if Della ac-
quired a life estate only, her children were entitled as against
the defendant claiming under the conveyance by Della.
20. Wardlaw v. Troy Oil Mill, 74 S. C. 368, 54 S. E. 658, 114 Am. St.
Rep. 1004 (1906). See Fidelity Trust and Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 158 S. C.
400, 155 S. E. 622 (1930). Cf. In re Smith, 48 F. Supp. 866 (E. D. S. C.
1943), discussed in note 153, infra. Cf. Andrews v. Hurst, 163 S. C.
86, 161 S. E. 331 (1931), to the effect that a tax being a debt due the
State, the State is a creditor entitled to the protection of the bailment
statute (CODE OF LAws OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 57-308). See Ste-
phens v. Hendricks, 226 2. C. 79, 83 S. E. 2d 634 (1954). In this situ-ation it seems that the State need not establish reliance upon the tax-
payer's ostensible ownership.
21. Carroll v. Cash Mills, 125 S. C. 332, 118 S. E. 290 (1928). See
Finance Corporation of America v. McGhee, 142 S. C. 380, 140 S. E.
691 (1927).
21ow Note 21, supra.
22. 234 S. C. 123, 107 S. E. 2d 4 (1959).
23. CODE oF LAWS oF SouTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 57-2. The Act is in-
applicable to instruments executed before October 1, 1924.
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On appeal, the circuit judge's conclusion that the Rule in
Shelley's Case did not apply was reversed by a unanimous
court. The added phrase, "if she should die without children,"
was found not to so qualify "lawful issue of her body" as to
make the latter phrase words of purchase instead of limita-
tion; therefore, the Rule applied to give Della a fee simple
conditional. The Court's careful opinion reviews many cases
and recognizes that all are not in harmony. The Woodle Case
is important as a considered reaffirmance that in construing
limitations to which the Act of 1924 is inapplicable the Court
has no mind, even in close cases, to abandon precedent and
the interpretive process in favor of a post 1924 presumption
against the applicability of the rule.
Tax Sales
Two cases24 involved claims of remaindermen against pur-
chasers at tax sales of lands sold for taxes assessed in the
name of the estates of deceased testators. Both were decided
in favor of the remaindermen, on the theory that a life ten-
ant's breach of his duty to return the land for taxation in
his name after the testator's death does not prejudice a re-
mainderman's right to possession at the death of the life ten-
ant. The same result follows despite the fact that the sale in
part was for taxes assessed during the life of the testator,
since the remaindermen's interest will not be affected when
it was not subjected to the lien of all the taxes for which the
land was sold25. Nor can adverse possession run against the
remaindermen in favor of the purchaser at the tax sale be-
fore the death of the life tenant.2 6
Time of Determination of Testator's Heirs
In Dean v. Lancaster2 7 a testator devised land "to my son
Alfred... and his wife Gertrude... for and during the life
of the survivor of them and at and after their death to go to
their children and if they should die without leaving children
then the same shall go to my Estate and become a part thereof
and shall be divided among my heirs according to the Statute
24. Stamper v. Avant, 233 S. C. 359, 104 S. E. 2d 565 (1958); Taylor
v. Jennings, 233 S. C. 600, 106 S. E. 2d 391 (1958).
25. Taylor v. Jennings, supra note 24.
26. Stamper v. Avant, supro, note 24.
27. 233 S. 0. 530, 105 S. E. 2d 675 (1958).
1959]
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of Distribution ... " At the testator's death his heirs were
his five children. Thereafter Alfred died childless, survived by
Gertrude, who was alive during pendency of the suit. In a
suit to construe the will the question was whether the heirs
who would take at Gertrude's death were to be determined
as of the date of the death of the testator, of Alfred, or of
Gertrude. The result would be the same if the heirs were de-
termined either at the testator's death or at Alfred's death.
The lower court determined the heirs as of Alfred's death,
which decision was affirmed on appeal.
The Court recognized the general rule that where a testator
makes a postponed gift of land to his heirs, the heirs will be
determined as of the time of the testator's death in the ab-
sence of a manifested contrary intent.28 While doubting the
existence of such contrary intent, the court reasoned that
even assuming such intent was manifested, certainly the tes-
tator did not intend to postpone aseertainment of his heirs
beyond the time when the interest limited to them could be-
come a vested remainder by reason of Alfred's death without
children. While the court correctly distinguishes the present
facts from those in Jones v. Holland29 the opinion may indicate
that in future cases a requirement of survivorship will not so
readily be implied as was done in the Holland Case. If this be
true, the Court's view is now in accord with the better Ameri-
can authority.8 0
Cases Omitted
Two cases more appropriately treated in other sections of
the annual survey are here omitted. Montague v. S. C. Tax
Commission,8 ' which is discussed in the taxation section, pri-
marily is concerned with the tax consequences under state law
of a deceased donee's failure to exercise a general testamen-
tary power of appointment. Allen Brothers Milling Co. v. Ad&
dams,32 an action to enjoin defendants from damming back
the water flowing on their land from plaintiff's land, is dis-
28. SIMES, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS 323 (1951);
RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 308.
29. 223 S. C. 500, 77 S. E. 2d 202 (1953).
30. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §§ 260, 261 and comment a; SIMES AND
SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS § 655. See 7 S. C. L. Q. 163 (1954), discuss-
ing Jones v. Holland, note 29, supra.
31. 233 S. C. 110, 103 S. E. 2d 769 (1958).
32. 233 S. C. 416, 105 S. E. 2d 257 (1958).
[Vol. 12
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cussed in the practice and procedure section. A third case,8
an equitable action to determine a boundary, raises no ques-
tions of interest.
Legislation
No property legislation was enacted during the survey pe-
riod.
33. James v. Hyman, 233 S. C. 283, 104 S. E. 2d 353 (1958).
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